Therefore, horizontal cooperation agreements between competitors which, on the basis of objective factors, would not be able to carry out the project covered by the cooperation or the activity covered by the cooperation independently. B, for example, because of the limited technical possibilities of the parties, will generally not have restrictive effects on competition within the meaning of Article 101, paragraph 1, unless the parties have been able to implement the project with less stringent restrictions. In the case of standardization agreements with different types of disclosure models from previous years in the field of intellectual property by those described in point 286, it would be appropriate to check on a case-by-case basis whether the disclosure model in question (example. B a disclosure model that does not require disclosure from previous years, but only encourages) effective access to the standard. In other words, it is appropriate to consider whether, in a specific context, an informed choice between the technologies and intellectual property principles associated with them is not prevented in practice by the disclosure model of previous years. The probability of a collusive outcome depends on the market power of the parties and the characteristics of the market in question. Cost coherence can only increase the risk of a collusive outcome if the parties have market power and marketing costs account for a significant portion of the variable costs associated with the products concerned. This is not the case. B homogeneous products for which production is the highest cost factor. However, the cohabitation of marketing costs increases the risk of a collusive outcome when the marketing agreement concerns products that involve costly marketing, for example. B high selling or marketing costs.
As a result, joint promotion or promotion agreements can also have restrictive effects on competition if these costs represent a significant cost. Analysis: Although the parties` combined market share is less than 15%, the fact that the agreement involves price fixing means the application of Article 101, paragraph 1. However, the parties would not have been able to enter the market for providing laundry services to institutional clients, either individually or in cooperation with fewer parties than the four parties to the agreement. Therefore, the agreement would not raise competition concerns, regardless of the price-fixing limitation which, in this case, may be considered essential to the promotion of the common mark and the success of the project. The evaluation of the use or effectiveness restrictions in section 101, paragraph 1, is only one page of the analysis. The other aspect reflected in Article 101, paragraph 3, is the assessment of the pro-competitive effects of restrictive agreements. The general direction for the application of Article 101, paragraph 3, is set out in the general guidelines. Where a restriction of competition within the meaning of Article 101, paragraph 1, has been demonstrated on a case-by-case basis, Article 101, paragraph 3, can be invoked as a defence. In accordance with Article 2 of Regulation (EC) 1/2003 of the Council of 16 December 2002 relating to the implementation of the competition rules under Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (35), the burden of proof under Article 101, paragraph 3, rests with the company that invokes the usefulness of this provision. Therefore, the actual arguments and evidence provided by the undertaking must allow the Commission to conclude that the agreement in question is sufficiently appropriate to produce or not pro-competitive effects.